With just under two years remaining until the 2027 general elections, Nigeria is being drawn into an intense and distracting political storm. The nation now watches a fierce and premature power tussle unfold, overshadowing urgent governance needs. President Bola Ahmed Tinubu’s administration is scrambling to present makeshift policies, half-formed palliatives, and political promises as notable achievements. Meanwhile, the main opposition parties are engulfed in internal chaos, claiming a targeted defection campaign is weakening their ranks. In the midst of it all, new political coalitions are being hastily cobbled together, often driven more by personal ambitions and ego than by any coherent national vision. The Nigerian populace, weary and disillusioned, watches these developments unfold with deepening anger—witnessing once again that democracy in the country is often more about power than people.
The strategy, if any, appears to be a pre-emptive one—crushing opposition forces well before official campaigns begin. The ruling All Progressives Congress (APC) has transformed transactional politics into its dominant operating model, rewarding defectors—especially those bringing influential figures from the Peoples Democratic Party (PDP) and Labour Party (LP)—with political appointments. The PDP, while crying foul over what it views as political persecution, is plagued by its own chronic internal dysfunction. The political landscape today is littered with metaphoric skeletons, echoing the addictive nature of power in Nigeria. The path to 2027 is set to be both dramatic and challenging for Nigerians, with many twists likely ahead.
For now, the APC is aggressively pursuing short-term optics, rather than real governance wins. It has been pulled into a contest of political supremacy even while critical socio-economic issues remain unresolved. The party’s overconfidence in its current approach—focusing more on swallowing opposition defectors than addressing governance failures—exposes a fatal flaw. It is also losing ground due to its poor communication strategies, its personalized power structure that alienates many insiders, and a President whose approval ratings remain alarmingly low across multiple regions.
Some argue that APC’s best hope lies in presenting a fresh candidate in 2027—a younger, healthier politician with a relatively clean public image. However, this seems improbable, given the strong grip President Tinubu maintains over the party’s structures. Should Tinubu run again, the party would be forced to heavily exploit ethnic and religious fault lines, and expend massive resources to secure loyalty and votes. A strategic shift from northern Muslim support to northern Christian backing might be necessary—but risky. Managing the interests of a growing collection of opportunistic defectors will prove extremely difficult, and could turn the APC’s current political gains into burdens.
The North will undoubtedly play a pivotal role in the 2027 elections. It remains especially susceptible to manipulation through ethnic, religious, and economic fault lines, particularly due to widespread poverty. The APC will need to avoid a repeat of the 2015 scenario, when it faced strong northern resistance. In the South West, Tinubu may secure some support, especially if the opposition puts forward a northern candidate. However, the region’s lack of full commitment should be a serious concern for the APC. The role of figures like Nyesom Wike could fluctuate depending on how the South-South region stabilizes around its long-standing political interests.
As for the Labour Party (LP), its relevance is deeply tied to Peter Obi. Without him, the party is likely to become a footnote; even with him, the political space is tightening. Obi’s influence is still significant, but he walks a fine line—any move that distances him from his support base could be politically costly. The South East, eager for national relevance, may seek a meaningful political deal that finally translates their long-standing agitation for equity into tangible power.
Former Vice President Atiku Abubakar remains the PDP’s most prominent figure, but also its most complicated. He is seen as too weak to decisively challenge Tinubu, yet too influential to be sidelined by new political forces. If he seeks another party platform, he would face stiff resistance and steep financial costs. Alternatively, he could retire from presidential ambition, lead a major reformation of the PDP, and contribute to a broader political restructuring. Still, for many in his political class, stepping back from the presidential race is simply unimaginable.
The PDP itself is deeply wounded by the relentless pressure from the APC. Though Atiku remains its most valuable asset, he is also the party’s biggest source of friction. His dominance deters coalition-building and fuels factional grievances. If PDP were strong and united, it wouldn’t be forced to rely on shaky alliances or chase after questionable partnerships. Once a political titan, the PDP now risks being remembered as the party that enabled APC’s success in 2027 by its own internal failures.
Several factors will shape the eventual outcome of the 2027 elections. While unexpected shifts are likely, certain elements will remain decisive. First, public perception of the APC’s governance record—over the remaining two years—will carry immense weight. Second, the organization and resolve of the opposition will be critical. Third, identity politics and regional alignments will remain influential. Most importantly, the credibility of the electoral process itself must be protected. The increasing interference of the executive arm in democratic institutions is alarming. For Nigeria’s democracy to survive and thrive, the 2027 elections must be free, fair, and credible—no matter the political stakes.
